The UK Supreme Court will eventually have to pass judgment on the compliance of the legal and policy framework for 'criminality information sharing' with the stipulations of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and perhaps in relation to more than one area of practice within public protection work. Parliament should recognise that there is a groundswell of judicial (and academic) opinion which suggests that, if the current legal framework regulating the sharing of information for the purposes of public protection is lawful, even in the face of criticism from the European Court of Human Rights, then an intolerable level of uncertainty as to the issue of that legality has now been reached. This paper addresses the root causes of this legal uncertainty, and argues for statutory reform to revisit even recent tinkering with the law in this area. In an overview of both a body of common law, in the form of a series of key decisions from the courts, as well as the tensions between two tracts of legislation, promoting public protection and human rights values occasionally at odds with one another, this piece examines the crucial issue of the retention of criminality information and the idea of individual (offender) consultation over its use in public protection work.
The Supreme Court will perhaps offer up another indictment of the way that the aims of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 is frustrated in certain employment, or 'public protection', contexts. Lord Dyson, Master of the Rolls, has gone so far as to note (extra-judicially) that the government needs to 'pull its finger out and introduce legislation' to address the way the criminal justice system does nothing to address long-term, inappropriate stigmatisation of some individuals.
2 But how have we reached such a controversial position from the courts?
This paper is an overview of the way that the law relating to 'criminality information sharing' (CIS) for public protection purposes has developed in a piecemeal fashion. It is also a call for systemic reform of the law in this arena of public responsibility. This is because unacceptable stigmatisation can result for some individuals from the permanency of indefinitely retained 'criminality information' which is in reality only 'quasicriminal', such as the details of allegations of criminality, as well as other peripheral categories.
Criminality information sharing in England and Wales is a conflicted issue in need of a more certain and transparent legal 'framework' or 'landscape' (Thomas & Walport, 2008) . The competing interests are those of individual personal privacy (and corresponding freedom from subjective privacy harms) (Calo, 2011) and the wider issues of public protection. 3 It has been acknowledged in sociological research that individuals try to reduce their own levels of stigmatisation through deliberate steps (Goffman, 1968) .
The Context of Criminality Information Sharing (CIS) Across Institutions in England and Wales
As well as the disclosure of criminal convictions and other 'police intelligence' stigmatising offenders in the employment context, personal privacy issues arise from the processes of personal information sharing across the criminal justice system in England and Wales, which can involve information being shared in prosecutions, for example where personal information is used as evidence in criminal trials, potentially as items of hearsay evidence 4 and bad character evidence. 5 Both hearsay evidence and bad character evidence in criminal trials are regulated by a codified statutory framework in the form of provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 6 This framework has seen recent judicial approval, while in comparison the framework for criminality information sharing has been much criticised as unsubtle.
The courts have recently had many occasions on which to scrutinise personal information sharing within a diverse array of public authorities in the context of health and social care, as well as other types of employers, by the police and other criminal justice agencies 8 in England and Wales. This sharing takes place chiefly to further the aims of public protection. 9 Information sharing also occurs across the criminal justice system in relation to the aims of probation organisations, 10 and prison authorities, as well as a growing European dimension to information sharing across criminal justice systems, 11 including England and Wales. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance uses the idea of sharing 'public protection information' to represent a professional and institutional ethos concerning public protection for policing authorities. 12 Indeed, Sir Ian Magee, 13 has it that the timely and appropriate sharing of information about 'risky' individuals across and outwith the criminal justice system creates 'public protection networks' (PPNs) (Magee, 2008: 14) . Magee also describes this 'police intelligence' as 'criminality information', 14 though in the light of the legal framework, which uses terms like 'personal data' 15 and 'sensitive personal data', 16 as well as 'personal information ', 17 this is a further vagary of terminology, which demonstrates a difference in attitude, perhaps, between lawyers' approaches to criminality information sharing and those of public protection professionals.
The Context of a Call for Reform of 'Criminality Information Sharing'
This paper is concerned with the extent to which the European Convention on Human Rights requires the involvement of an individual on a practicable basis when information about their criminality, or alleged criminality, is being shared for public protection purposes. Since the organisations that make up the array of components within Magee's 'public protection networks' (PPNs) (Magee, 2008: 14) are public authorities for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, they must look to uphold the 'right to respect for private life' possessed by members of the public, which they are owed under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Gross LJ has observed that 'Art. 8 is now a well-travelled area of our law, perhaps too well-travelled' 18 -but this well-travelled road has not brought the process of CIS to a place of clarity.
The law is unclear and recent statutory reforms have failed to add clarity to the law on the issue of individual consultation.
ACPO's recommended 'checklist' approach in CIS decisionmaking (ACPO, 2010b) laid out in their guidance, which is followed by senior police officers in justifying the decisions they take to share 'criminality information', features assumptions about the identity of an individual as an 'offender', but recent cases heard in the High Court and Court of Appeal have featured the sharing of allegations, not convictions, in contexts that are then highly stigmatising for individuals seeking or trying to retain employment in sensitive arenas such as childcare, healthcare, education and social care, etc. 19 Regardless of the terminology used in relation to 'criminality information' or 'intelligence' sharing, or the exact decisionmaking process concerned in a particular case of information sharing, there is a consistent and considerable stigma which may be attached to those individuals about whom the information is shared in an 'employability' context. The individual may perhaps not even have been charged with particularly stigmatising offences, let alone tried for or convicted of them. From an individualistic, 'rights-based' view, such as that required by the Human Rights Act 1998, as opposed to a purely societal one, this raises considerable (legal) difficulties.
For example, we can look to the case of R (W) v Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police [2012] EWHC 406 (Admin) for the sort of circumstance concerned. This case involved a school teacher of 'considerable experience' seeking work as a supply teacher, who will be effectively unemployable with a number of unproven serious allegations concerning his conduct recorded on the Police National Database -given their inclusion by a police authority on the Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate he needs to present as effectively 'clean' in order to find employment as a schoolteacher. 20 In dismissing the claim brought by W, having found that the decision to disclose the serious allegations in the ECRC had struck the right balance, Judge Gilbart QC did note that: one must consider the serious effect which disclosure has upon his prospects of obtaining employment as a teacher of children, which should not be underestimated. I have no doubt that it has had a serious effect on him to pursue his career, not least because teaching was his chosen vocation. Disclosure does not prevent him obtaining employment, nor from obtaining employment in education, but it will prevent him from doing so in situations where children or vulnerable adults are involved, and that may effectively exclude him from anything but adult education.
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But there are cases brought where allegations, and convictions, for far less serious incidents, relatively speaking, are denying people employment connected to their 'vocation' in a way that the Court of Appeal has now recently deemed unlawful.
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State Surveillance, Databases and Public Protection Dr Lindsay Clutterbuck has outlined the way that developing new intelligence gathering techniques within the Metropolitan Police was a 19th-century reaction to a threat, perceived or otherwise, posed by Irish nationalist extremists and other terrorist organisations of the day (Clutterbuck, 2002: 242-244) . Today, electronic governance and 'dataveillance' (Clarke, 1988) depend on the effective deployment of information technology systems across operational organisations, boundaries and even legal jurisdictions. 23 The Police National Computer (PNC) and the Violent and Sexual Offenders Register (ViSOR) are two examples of multidatabases which are used operationally to provide 'police intelligence' on individuals that is used to affect decision-making that concerns those individuals, chiefly in the detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes, as well as parole and probation practices and decisions, and the wider employment vetting context (Pitt-Payne, 2009). Further, some databases, and risk assessment software that draws on databases, form part of the wider criminal justice e-governance context (for example, the Electronic Offender Assessment System, or e-OASys, 24 is used to 'process' 'personal data' and 'sensitive personal data' in a human rights-sensitive probationary context).
Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs) are, by the measure of the number of judicial review cases which target them as a disclosure method, the most contested instances of personal information sharing in the sense of the work of the criminal justice system (Pitt-Payne, 2009) and, specifically, the role of the police in divulging information to employers and volunteering co-ordinators in the vetting process, where children and vulnerable adults must be 'safeguarded'.
Timothy Even if there is no request from the regulatory body, it seems to me that if the police come into possession of confidential information which, in their reasonable view, in the interests of public health or safety, should be considered by a professional or regulatory body, then the police are free to pass that information to the relevant regulatory body for its consideration.
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For those individuals about whom stigmatising criminality information is shared, though, the law today,is both reassuringly and perplexingly more complex. A key consideration in this issue, from the perspective of the individual, is the existence of the right to respect for private and family life contained in Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 26 and the interpretive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
This set of Europeanised, and Europeanising, privacy values has effect in UK law through the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, though the Human Rights Act 1998 will potentially be amended by a UK Bill of Rights 27 -perhaps losing some of the linking and 'interpretive' role between the courts in the UK and the European Convention on Human Rights, and hence Article 8 of the ECHR and the right to respect for a private life, as well as Strasbourg jurisprudence on privacy issues.
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As for the issue of criminal records stigmatising convicted offenders, the former Minister for Justice, Ken Clarke, has announced proposed reforms to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 framework -generally looking to reduce the time offenders must declare their criminal convictions as unspent, although not with regard to offenders who were imprisoned for lengthier prison sentences, starting at the level of four years' imprisonment (Travis & Bowcott, 2012) . The legal context to personal information (or 'personal data') sharing across the public sector, just as across the private sector, is also regulated by the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
The notion of confidentiality and the legal action, or tort, known as the 'misuse of private information', as well as the doctrines of defamation, are grounds used to broadly protect personal privacy that have evolved in our courts. Suffice to say that when a public authority sharing information as part of a 'PPN' looks to its duties under statute, then these wider legal concerns fall away in circumstances where the public authority has shared personal information across the public sector. Such is the authority of statutory provisions when considered as legal duties or powers that further the aim of public protection. Importantly, there is a 'public interest' type of defence available with regard to any actions for breach of confidence, and the courts will always look to the common law police power to share information on the basis of a 'pressing need' even when there might be said to be a breach of confidentiality involved, given a situation of sufficient gravity. 29 The Court of Appeal has noted the impossibility of extending a tortious duty of care to the CIS process conducted by police authorities on a public policy basis.
30
One pertinent example of the different qualities of 'criminality information' versus more general 'police intelligence' is the operation of s. 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which enables public authorities to share personal information with the police or another body, such as a local authority, when it is requested in connection with an application for an anti-social behaviour order. 31 With regard to what can more certainly be described as 'criminality information' rather than mere 'police intelligence', specific statutory provisions in relation personal information sharing for criminal justice purposes in England and Wales includes those that underpin the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (Criminal Justice Act 2003 s. 327A).
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The Police Act 1997 as amended, for example, includes provisions in s. 113B that govern the use of 'police intelligence', also known as 'soft intelligence', by police authorities in disclosing personal information as part of the compilation of Enhanced Criminal Record Certificates (ECRCs). This process is then governed by which information is 'relevant' to a particular employment vetting scenario and a consideration of what 'ought to be included' in an ECRC. Given the nature of this dual test as one based on both factual relevancy and a consideration of what is proportionate to disclose, and in the light of the extreme sensitivity of the 'soft intelligence' concerned, it is no surprise that the interpretations of these provisions by police authorities has been regularly contested in the courts.
A Critical Analysis of the Law of 'Criminality Information Sharing'
The key right, freedom or legitimate interest at stake, since we are concerned with personal information sharing by a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, is the Art. 8 ECHR right to respect for private life enjoyed by every data subject when their personal data is shared, as acknowledged by the leading case of R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3. The right to respect for private life is 'engaged' by the sharing itself, and will be unlawfully 'infringed' (entailing an actionable breach of Human Rights Act 1998 s. 6(1)) unless that infringement is legitimate, proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
Plainly, the sharing of personal data with the kinds of criminal justice, taxation and immigration agencies envisaged by the scope of this report is necessary in a democratic society -the Magee Report, as noted above, spoke in 2008 of the creation in the UK information society of 'Public Protection Networks' and emphasised their importance in safeguarding the public (Magee, 2008: 14) .
The Data Protection Act 1998, with its implied powers to share information for public authorities, ensures a public authority is plainly acting legitimately as long as it accounts for the second schedule processing rule in relation to non-consensual sharing in terms of public protection responsibilities and interests in the avoidance of harm -which brings us to the notion of sharing information proportionately.
Proportionality or the lack thereof is a ground of judicial review of the actions and decisions of UK public authorities. It relies as a test of lawfulness on a measurement of the balancing exercise the relevant public authority has undertaken when deliberating the impact and harms on an individual or group of individuals when taking some action or decision with a particular motivation or purpose. L is a superb example of how this balancing exercise must be free of presumptions. It cannot be said, following L, that the safeguarding of children or vulnerable adults is a priority over the right to respect for private life an individual enjoys. Each potential personal data sharing decision must be analysed on its merits. To this end, the factual relevancy of the personal data that may be shared to the aims and outcomes of that sharing must be fully and demonstrably taken into account in any kind of 'checklist' approach to decision-making, as noted above. 'Relevancy' then, as a key notion within a test for proportionality, does not exist solely as a single leg of the dual test in s. 113B of the Police Act 1997 in the ECRC 'soft intelligence' context, but in all personal information sharing contexts connected with the criminal justice system in England and Wales.
R (L) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis
[2009] UKSC 3 is the leading case in the area of 'criminality information' sharing (CIS) across the public sector, and emphasises that a truly balanced approach to decision-making must be taken to accord with the notion of proportionality, since Art. 8 ECHR rights of data subjects are engaged in this situation. There is also a requirement in the common law, now stemming from this leading precedent, that the subject of what we can term 'criminality information' be consulted where appropriate before information is shared. Council [2011] EWCA Civ 403 demonstrates that the approach to sharing personal data in a context which sees Art. 8 ECHR rights engaged must be fair, balanced and proportionate. H & L was a case involving the proactive sharing by a local authority of information relating to criminal convictions -and in this case the Court of Appeal held that this required that the local authority in sharing the information should have sought to consult the data subject, H, before the sharing took place. However, in this case there was an acknowledged lack of factual relevance in the sharing of the sensitive personal data (i.e. no link between the role H was involved in and the nature of his convictions), and the case involved the proactive information sharing context, making consultation practically more feasible.
H & L v A City
Lord Kennedy noted the importance of the consultation of the individual about whom the criminality information may be shared, saying: 'Obviously in each case a balance has to be struck between competing public interests, and at least arguably in some cases the reasonableness of the police view [with regard to the disclosure of the information] may be open to challenge.' Further, it could be implied that, in the context of sharing 'personal data', where the second schedule processing rules in the Data Protection Act 1998 (still of key concern in the s. 29 exemption for 'crime and taxation' context) include specific consent-based processing options such as contractual agreements etc., as well as the additional option of processing (here, 'sharing') personal data because it is necessary to protect the vital interests of the 'data subject' -or necessary given the legitimate interests of the third party with which the personal data is shared (e.g. the police), though never where the processing is 'unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject' -that some processing and therefore sharing of personal data will be non-consensual and therefore occur without consulting the data subject concerned. 36 Of course, 'proportionality' will still be a vital factor in this rationale for non-consensual disclosure, given the 'interpretive' provisions of s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, where in our particular information sharing contexts Art. 8 ECHR rights are engaged and therefore 'read into' statutory provisions by the UK courts. EWCA Civ 175 showed that some allegations will be relevant in sharing information to protect the public/ safeguard children or vulnerable people, though again, proportionality is key. Proportionality and factual relevancy, as mentioned above, are the two legal tests from s. 113B of the Police Act 1997, the statutory provisions relevant in C since this is a 'soft intelligence' case involving the ECRC process. The emphasis on the core issue of 'proportionality' is unmistakable.
The requirement of consultation with subjects of 'criminality information' before the information itself is shared is thus an emerging requirement in the common law.
But, according to Wilson LJ we needn't be too concerned 'on behalf of Chief Constables' as the common law 'suggests the impracticability of any substantial degree of consultation between Chief Constables and applicants prior to issue of [ The issue then is that there is no specific statutory guidance, or rather express statutory language, as to what an appropriate degree of consultation, to satisfy the proportionality requirement in CIS, might be in particular circumstances -and this is perhaps where statutory codification, or better, perhaps, a truly high degree of statutory specificity and protection of individuals' procedural rights to consultation, would be of real and meaningful assistance to Chief Constables and others responsible for the sharing of 'criminality information' across the public sector.
It is argued that there is only some limited procedural protection from severe stigmatisation in employment and other contexts because of a requirement of consultation with regard to the disclosure of unproven allegation and other 'soft intelligence' about individuals. 40 In the UKSC decision in L, it seems that Lord Neuberger (at para. 76) makes a distinction between 'public' criminality information, such as conviction data, and 'soft' or 'police' 'intelligence', which is best regarded as 'public protection information'. Lord Neuberger then notes that: 'Whether as a result of a conviction or a caution (which involves the person concerned having admitted committing the offence in question), there can be little doubt that the information in question will be accurate, and will have been sufficiently grave as to amount to a crime.' 41 
Following binding precedent set in L, Kenneth Parker J in R (Thomas) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police
[2012] EWHC 147 (Admin) says (at para. 47), in relation to the lack of discretion with regard to 'blanket' sharing convictions and cautions or warnings in an Enhanced Criminal Records Certificate (ECRC) under provisions of the Police Act 1997, that if he 'had not been so constrained' he 'would have found that the present system that allows no exceptions and provides no mechanism for review was disproportionate and not compatible with Article 8 . . .' 42 In his judgment Kenneth Parker J also notes the impact of the Five Forces 43 decision in enabling the indefinite retention of convictions, cautions or warnings, and other categories of 'unproven' criminality information. 44 Kenneth Parker J also notes the calls made by Sunita Mason and others in relation to introducing a potentially more complex screening approach, which would then entail a less stigmatising approach for use by the public protection networks concerned with CIS. 45 Kenneth Parker J's comments in obiter though (at para. 35) are enlightened, and enlightening, as he said: 'A system that permitted exceptions would probably be more prone to error, but only marginally so if the criteria for review were themselves conservative and risk averse. The consequential improvement to the protection of Article 8 rights, on the other hand, would be likely to be substantial.' 
The Questionable Impact of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012
The relevant reforming provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have recently been brought into force, but are not the final word in the debate over the appropriateness of a consultation requirement in the criminality information sharing (CIS) process.
There has been no introduction of an exclusionary principle relating to information based on the increasing age or relative triviality of information such as a 'spent' conviction, a more minor offence by category such as property or dishonesty-type offences (rather than violent or dishonesty offences), or cautions, warnings or even unproven allegations or unsuccessful prosecutions as 'soft intelligence' (which would still remain the concern of Kenneth Parker J in T, as above, therefore).
So our general conclusion, as above, is that there is a general duty to consult where practicable on an authority like a police body engaged in CIS, even through the ECRC creation process, because of developments in the common law under the influence of Art. 8 ECHR.
However, s. 79 PoFA 2012 abolishes the requirement for an ECRC to be sent to the 'registered person'. So the ECRC will first be sent only to the individual it describes, rather than simultaneously to their prospective employer. An individual can then apply to an independent monitor for a review of the content of the ECRC as to the relevance of the information therein, and whether it ought to have been included (Police Act 1997 s. 117A as amended by PoFA 2012 s. 82).
The independent monitor must then ask the chief officer of the relevant police authority to review the stance they had on the relevance of the information, and whether it ought to have been included (Police Act 1997 s. 117A as amended by PoFA 2012 s. 82).
When this new process is inevitably tested in the courts, how will the common law consultation requirement created by the courts drawing on Art. 8 ECHR be seen in the light of these statutory reforms? This author suggests there are numerous ways to imply consultation or notification duties on policing authorities as possible options for a figurative High Court judge to consider in relation to the operation of the new statutory process. However, the most sensible in terms of practicality, efficacy and Art. 8 ECHR and Art. 6 ECHR compliance might be to place a consultation duty on the Independent Monitor at the ECRC review stage, and a separate requirement to consult on the police at the ECRC creation stage, and a duty on the police only to ensure the 'giving of reasons' at the ECRC review stage.
It remains to be seen how ACPO and statutory guidance on CIS will be amended in the light of the new statutory framework with regard to the creation, and now review, of ECRCs.
Remedying a Breach of Procedural Art. 8 ECHR Rights in Retrospect?
In the case of Regina (Royal College I consider that it is the (often irreversible) detrimental effect of the inclusion in the list that makes the breach of Article 6 at the first stage of the process incurable by any of the measures later in the process which are designed to afford a sufficiency of procedural protection to the person concerned. 48 
But in some CIS cases, such as R (B) v The Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary
[2011] EWHC 2362 (Admin), there can be an acknowledgment from the judge in their ratio that procedural rights of consultation, afforded by the HRA 1998 and developed in the common law, can be breached but then also protected by some form of 'consultation in retrospect', or the recording of protest at the CIS process, though ultimately this is not something of great importance given the judge's ultimate aim of upholding the legitimacy of a decision to share criminality information in order to protect the public.
It remains to be seen exactly how the kind of statutory provisions argued for here could be enacted, and how the courts might interpret these new practices, but there are still remaining concerns over the lack of genuine limiting principle on disclosure of criminal records, and the lack of an express statutory consultation requirement on police authorities.
The Issue of the Indefinite Retention of 'Criminality Information'
In the Court of Appeal decision known as Five Forces, 49 five Chief Constables succeeded in arguing that the model of indefinitely retaining conviction data and 'soft intelligence' on the Police National was lawful despite arguments as to the curtailment of data protection rights and the human right to a private life. The Information Commissioner was unsuccessful in establishing that an earlier decision of the Information Tribunal was correct in declaring the PNC operation unlawful because of the indefinite retention of personal data of the most sensitive kind, known commonly and variously as 'criminal records', 'criminality information', 'police intelligence' or 'conviction data'.
According to the Court of Appeal, the legislative basis of the national records system was such that the Data Protection Act 1998 and its interaction with other statutes enabling police 'operational purposes' afforded the notion of lawful operation to this system. Furthermore, the Court found that Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights was not engaged with respect to the indefinite retention of the records concerned. In that more recent case, Gross LJ, in refusing the application for judicial review brought by the claimant, determined that it was possible to distinguish the retention of text-based information, namely the personal data describing Catt, recorded by police officers attending an anti-armaments industry protest, from the retention of photographs of protestors taken covertly by plain-clothes police officers, as in Wood. 51 In Catt, Gross LJ was adamant that the retention of data recorded about a public event might comprise personal data for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998, but that its indefinite retention was allowed for by s.29 of the DPA, and that Art. 8 ECHR was not engaged by that indefinite retention, since the event was indeed public and the data gathered using visible policing methods, i.e. overt surveillance of a demonstration or protest. Gross LJ was also certain that if it could be said Art. 8 ECHR was engaged by the indefinite retention of such material on the databases of the National Domestic Extremism Unit, this retention was justified by the fact that the organising group which motivated the protest was one which included individuals who had committed criminal offences at protests and demonstrations, and thus the retention of the personal data was necessary for intelligence purposes. It is notable, however, that Catt, just like Wood, was not arrested, let alone prosecuted or convicted, in relation to any events at the protests or demonstrations concerned. As noted above, Gross LJ also cynically observed that, 'Art. 8 is now a well-travelled area of our law, perhaps too well-travelled.' T received a harassment notice from the police after she allegedly made a homophobic comment to the friend of a neighbour. R received a similar notice following a complaint from a woman, Ms A, whom he had previously had a relationship with, who alleged that he was causing her distress by calling her on the telephone.
Although dismissing the application for judicial reviewing, denying the two claimants the ability to have the records of their harassment notices deleted, on the basis that their retention was justified, Eady J was confident that Art. 8 ECHR was engaged, noting that 'the reach of Article 8 is significantly broader than its wording would suggest if taken literally . . .' and therefore, he thought, encompassed the retention of such quasi-criminality information. 53 What were the relevant paragraphs of a decision by the . . . covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person's physical and social identity… The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Art. 8. The subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding. However, in determining whether the personal information retained by the authorities involves any of the private-life aspects mentioned above, the Court will have due regard to the specific context in which the information at issue has been recorded and retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed and the results that may be obtained.
This author predicts that in the future the UK Supreme Court will have to deal with a judicial review case which seeks to determine the issue of whether retention of personal data by a police authority engages Art. 8 ECHR or not.
It is certainly noteworthy that in his judgment in Catt, Gross LJ did not refer to S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50, as Eady J did in T and R. This author feels a UKSC judgment on the issue of Art. 8 ECHR 'engagement' by the retention by the police of personal data could not be wilfully or mistakenly ignored by the High Court.
Furthermore, in some judgments since Five Forces, the accuracy of the data held on the PNC has been challenged in the context of its being shared.
In the case of C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2010] EWHC 1601, the High Court judge presiding, Langstaff J, noted approvingly that the wording of the applicant's data on the PNC had been amended to make it more accurate, and less distorting of the allegations made against C; though the primary issue in the case was the (un)lawfulness of the allegations about C being shared. 54 This High Court decision was admittedly overturned in the appeal case of C v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2011] EWCA Civ 175, where the Court of Appeal determined that the allegations could in fact be shared lawfully, but there was no suggestion by the Court of Appeal that the amendment of the language of the entry on the PNC was an incorrect adjustment of the police records. 55 Furthermore, cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights have suggested that Article 8 ECHR is violated where an individual is incorrectly labelled as an offender in police records when they are not actually convicted or they have not even undergone prosecution. 56 This demonstrates that it can be argued that the retention of police records or 'criminality information' in some form will engage Article 8 ECHR rights to a private life for an individual, even if this is only where the retention of the data might perpetuate some inaccuracy or ongoing or lasting unfairness.
Conclusion
It is suggested that statutory (re)codification of the principles developed by the High Court, Court of Appeal and so forth on issues of personal information sharing across criminal justice organisations in England and Wales would allow for a greater raising of awareness amongst police authorities, rather than the steady progression of common law interpretations of a contested set of statutory provisions. To this end, it is also suggested that the part-reform of the relevant provisions in the Police Act 1997, given the introduction of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, will not be an entire, comprehensive solution to this lack of clarity. As noted at the outset of this piece, the Court of Appeal has very recently determined that the amended provisions of the Police Act 1997 are incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights -which would lend a particular urgency to reform of the 1997 Act should the Supreme Court confirm this stance. 57 Better than the current framework for inclusion of information on ECRCs etc., on a potentially sweeping basis, would be the kind of semi-rigid, contextualisable frameworks or 'gateways' that would allow for the exemption and inclusion of certain kinds of category of information to be shared in certain contexts, 58 
